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An article in the 14.1 issue of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action made some observations about the completion status of the Falkland 
Islands Demining Program.2 This article aims to ar-
ticulate the program’s objectives, the problems encoun-
tered and methodologies used, and to draw on some of 
the key lessons learned from the experience.
Objectives
The program’s objectives were twofold: to conduct a 
pilot clearance program to meet the requirements of Ar-
ticle 5 obligations and to inform future projects about 
clearance challenges. For this reason, the U.K. govern-
ment selected four suspected hazardous areas in close 
consultation with the Falkland Islands government, 
which would provide different types of terrain and dif-
ferent mine and unexploded-ordnance threats—two 
SHAs near Stanley were known minefields (Surf Bay and 
Sapper Hill), and accurate minefield documents were 
held for them, while the ones in Goose Green and Fox 
Bay East had a less well-defined threat. The U.K. gov-
ernment set standards in excess of International Mine 
Action Standards by demanding a 200-millimeter (7.87 
inches) contract depth for the clearance of mine pan-
els. In addition, mines affected by the formation of sand 
dunes required excavation 300 millimeters (11.81 inch-
es) below the 1982 profile. These increased standards 
were designed to address concerns within the island 
community about the ability of a mine-clearance pro-
gram to remove all of the explosive hazards.
The Threat
The Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study3 identi-
fied the different types of landmines encountered on 
the islands. The majority of minefields contain plas-
tic, minimum-metal mines, which present a challenge 
for conventional metal-detection technologies due to 
the exceptionally small quantities of metal within the 
mines. Some of the SHAs had been subjected to BL 755 
cluster-munitions strikes, but because of their high 
metallic content, these did not present the same level of 
technical challenge to detect.
Clearance Methodologies Used
Modern metal-detection equipment struggled to de-
tect the minimum-metal mines to the contract depth. 
Therefore, the demining contractor BACTEC Interna-
tional Ltd. used layered and full excavation techniques, 
depending on the expected mine threat, to meet the 
contract’s requirements. The mines had been laid in a 
very formal pattern using cord and markers at inter-
vals, and the documents recording the two minefields 
near Stanley soon proved to be credible records of the 
mine pattern.4 Therefore, once rows were encountered, 
the mine patterns could be followed and fully exploit-
ed using excavation techniques. This is a slow and de-
manding method of clearance in normal circumstances, 
but additional external factors exacerbated the situation 
further. During austral summer 2009–10, the Island re-
corded the worst weather patterns on record, with con-
ditions including cold high winds, rain, sleet and snow. 
Additionally, much of the contaminated ground con-
sisted of thick, fibrous peat and heavy vegetation, which 
was difficult to cut. This challenged the deminers5 to 
draw on exceptional levels of patience, skill, good hu-
mor, and sheer grit and determination. 
The Surf Bay Minefield was the most challenging 
task. The dense, mixed minefield contained more than 
1,000 mines (SB33 & SB81) within a relatively small area 
of 3.34 hectares (8.25 acres), and the terrain also varied 
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The United Kingdom has started to remove anti-personnel mines from the Falkland/Malvinas 
Islands1 in order to meet its obligations under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention. A pilot phase 
was completed in June 2010 to clear four suspected hazardous areas—a critical first step to 
inform future projects following the conclusion of the Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study. 
within it. The local airport road bi-
sected the minefield with deep peat 
to the west and gradually thinner 
peat and sandier terrain toward the 
beach on the east. Six mixed mine 
panels6 straddled a previous track in 
sandy soil in the minefield’s north-
east part where sand accumula-
tion demanded manual excavation 
of 400 millimeters (15.74 inches). 
Two further panels, consisting of 16 
anti-vehicle mines each, had been 
covered by large sand dunes since 
1982. Conflict-aerial photography 
revealed that the mines had been 
laid at the current beach level, which 
was marked by a cobbled layer of 
stone, but the sand dunes were be-
tween two and five meters (7–16 feet) 
above that level. After initially iden-
tifying the start of the first panel us-
ing manual excavation techniques, it 
then became a mechanical clearance 
task routinely operating in four to 
five meters (13–16 feet) of sand. 
Finding mines at these depths re-
quired systematic search procedures. 
One early lesson learned was that a 
detailed, centimeter-accurate survey, 
used to establish exactly what had 
been excavated and where the mines 
were located, was absolutely essen-
tial to ensure efficient use of time 
and resources. Fortunately, the Pub-
lic Works Department on the Islands 
had access to Real Time Kinematic 
Survey7 and its survey team support-
ed the minefield mapping process 
very effectively. 
Where the threat was less well-
defined at Goose Green and Fox Bay, 
traditional non-technical and tech-
nical survey procedures were ad-
opted. Much information still exists 
within the Falkland Islands local 
and military community and among 
military veterans concerning the 
events that took place during and 
immediately after the 1982 conflict. 
Fortunately for this pilot project, 
quality information was available. 
This may not be the case for many 
other areas where the minefield doc-
uments and records do not exist, 
and as time goes on, memories will 
fade, and key witnesses will be hard-
er to track and interview. 
The Environment
Concerns about the project’s en-
vironmental impact were raised be-
fore it began and were a particular 
issue for the Falkland Islands gov-
ernment. The Planning Permission 
and consent provided by the FI gov-
ernment required submission of an 
acceptable ground remediation plan 
with each SHA Clearance Plan and 
that steps were taken to educate the 
deminers in the identification of 
rare plant species expected in the 
area. The Clearance Plans divided 
the cleared areas into three parts:
1. One area is left to recover natu-
rally.
2. One area has the cut vegetation 
replaced so seeds from the cut-
tings can drop and germinate.
fully excavating the access lanes on sapper hill before the first P4Bs were encountered.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot, DPo technical aDviser
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3. One area is left for a different 
approach to be specified using 
natural and introduced meth-
ods. A broad plan was devel-
oped to satisfy these planning 
conditions. 
Perfectly rebuilding the sand 
dunes was never an aspiration, but 
in close cooperation with the Envi-
ronmental Planning Department, 
BACTEC replaced the sand to the 
best of their abilities, stabilizing the 
dunes’ bases where possible using 
geo-textiles and aggregate bags. The 
area was left deliberately unsmooth 
in order to provide relief for natural 
forces to work on and to catch drift-
ing seeds for germination purposes. 
Monitoring will take place over 
the next two years to establish the 
most effective approach for future 
programs; not only does it need to 
be environmentally acceptable, it 
needs to be a practical, relatively 
simple and cost-effective procedure. 
These additional planning require-
ments are not always associated with 
mine-action programs and provided 
different challenges which required 
close liaison with local environmen-
tal bodies.
Although the tender document 
had been written to discourage the 
use of specialist mechanical sys-
tems, at the end of the process, the 
final result was visually not dissimi-
lar to what might have resulted from 
a mechanical approach without the 
advantages of immediate re-germi-
nation when earth is processed and 
seeds are reintroduced immediate-
ly. As a result of the pilot program, 
these alternative approaches may be 
considered during follow-up phases.
Results
The following table represents the 
areas actually cleared (including ad-
ditional battle-area clearance tasks 
associated with the four SHAs) and 
records the mines and UXO locat-
ed between 3 December 2009 and 4 
June 2010:
In order to place this into con-
text, it is useful to note that Argen-
tina10 declared to the United Nations 
that it brought 25,000 landmines to the Falkland Is-
lands at the start of the conflict (20,000 anti-personnel 
and 5,000 anti-vehicle mines) and that some 5,000 have 
been accounted for since the conflict ended. This means 
that approximately 20,000 landmines remained in the 
ground prior to Phase 1 clearance and that this pro-
gram cleared more than 6 percent of the remaining 
mine contamination. 
Confidence Building
An important part of any demining program is in-
stilling confidence within the local community. On 
arrival, the Demining Programme Office11 needed to 
reassure the community that all the mines could be re-
moved from the areas selected, and to address a wide-
ly-held community view that the money could be better 
spent removing mines in other parts of the world. While 
this may be an honorable stance, the United Kingdom 
has an international obligation to clear the landmines in 
the Falkland Islands; therefore, the money for the Phase 1 
program was allocated separately from the donations the 
United Kingdom provided for other international mine-
action projects.   
The Falkland Islands government was also concerned 
about the risk of injury to deminers when local demand 
to clear the minefields was nonexistent, no civilian inju-
ries were sustained, and the minefields posed no human-
armored excavator searching for the sB81 mines at the 1982 profile within the surf Bay sand Dunes.
Photo courtesy of the author
the sand was replaced in a manner to provide relief for natural forces to operate.
Photo courtesy of JosePhine sWanson
SHA AP Mines AV Mines UXO Area Cleared
Surf Bay SA-008 488 SB33 568 SB81 1 M67 Grenade + 7.62mm ammo 3.34 Ha
Surf Bay BAC
(Canache Wet Area) - -
4 M67 Grenades 
+ 7.62 ammo 3.44 Ha
Sapper Hil SA-025 190 P4B - - 0.77 Ha
Sapper Hill BAC8 
(BL755 Strike Area) - - - 6.29 Ha
Goose Green GG-011 - - - 2.41 Ha
Fox Bay FB-008W - - - 2.3 Ha
Fox Bay BAC (Head-
land Area) - - - 1.99 Ha
9
Total 678 568 8 UXO + 7.62mm ammo 20.54 Ha
summary of areas cleared.
itarian, social or economic impact to the community. 
Fortunately, no one sustained injuries during the pro-
gram, which can be attributed to good procedures, cor-
rect protective equipment and a strong ethos for safety 
adopted by BACTEC and the DPO.
The FI government and the local community were 
also influenced by certain historical myths that had per-
petuated over time, adding to the belief that full clear-
ance was impossible. One of these myths was that mines 
move in peat and would not be found. Most surface lay-
ers of peat (0–300 millimeters, or 0–11.81 inches) contain 
fibrous peat, or at least semi-fibrous peat, in the topsoil’s 
lower parts, with a structure displaying horizontal lami-
nations reflecting the gradual accumulation of little-de-
composed plant debris. The large surface area and light 
weight of the mine would make it highly unlikely to shift 
within the peat and, indeed, the Phase 1 clearance pro-
gram found no evidence of this. Taking Sapper Hill as 
an example of a typical peat minefield, no P4B mine was 
found deeper than 120 millimeters (4.72 inches), and 97 
percent were at less than 80 millimeters (3.14 inches) or 
were located on the surface. The program did conclude, 
not surprisingly, that light, plastic anti-personnel mines 
can be moved by wind, water or by ground slippage, 
particularly when the topography, such as downhill 
gradients, was also a factor. Most mines were discov-
ered at their predicted location within the documented 
2
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pattern, but natural forces had moved a very small mi-
nority. What is particularly interesting is that the condi-
tion of the majority of the mines was very good despite 
resting in acidic soil and damp conditions for 28 years, 
and we assess that most would certainly have functioned 
given the right pressure.
The FI government, concerned about its residual li-
ability in the event of any future incident within the 
cleared areas, considered a number of proposals to keep 
the fences and some form of warning signs in place af-
ter clearance. The DPO made many announcements 
through the media to keep the community fully in-
formed of the clearance process, encouraged visits to the 
minefields and held briefings to explain the detail and 
quality procedures associated with the clearance pro-
gram. In addition, a public confidence demonstration 
was run after the completion of each task site. Following 
the last demonstration at Surf Bay, spectators swarmed 
onto the cleared area with their children confirming 
their confidence in the clearance process.
the manually excavated area at sapper hill. (yellow pickets indi-
cate where P4B mines were found.)
Photo courtesy of the author
Robin Swanson, MBE, Director of Biron Associ-
ates Ltd., is a former British Army Bomb Disposal 
Officer who worked with C King Associates Ltd. 
for the duration of the Phase 1 Demining Pro-
gram. Prior to leaving the British Army, he worked 
in the U.K. Ministry of Defence as a senior policy 
maker in International Humanitarian Law, specifi-
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conventional munitions, unexploded ordnance and 
landmines. He also participated in the Joint U.K.–











Strengthening the Demining   
 Sector Response to HIV/AIDS  
  in Sub-Saharan Africa 
by Dr. Martin Chitsama [ Demining HIV/AIDS Service Foundation ]
In this article, the author explores how HIV/AIDS affects deminers in the African areas 
where the disease is most prevalent. He considers how deminers’ lifestyles make them 
especially susceptible to HIV/AIDS and suggests mobile HIV/AIDS programs can effec-
tively combat this growing threat.
Demining began in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, incidental-
ly commencing just a decade after 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic started 
calling on the human race.1 Ac-
cording to the 2007 and 2009 Land-
mine Monitor Report and national 
mine-action centers in Africa, at 
least 50 national and international 
demining organizations currently 
conduct landmine-clearance opera-
tions in Sub-Saharan Africa, collec-
tively employing more than 10,000 
deminers.2 Angola's National Dem-
ining Institute alone has a contin-
gent of 4,000 deminers organized 
into 18 brigades that are demining 
across the heavily mined southern 
African country.2
Considering that all the African 
States Parties to the Ottawa Conven-
tion are lagging behind their targets 
under Article 5 and are continually 
calling for extensions, deminers in 
Africa are set to clear landmines on 
the continent for many more years. 
As reported in 2009 by the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS), the region is also 
"more heavily affected by HIV and 
AIDS than any other region of the 
world.” All in all, “an estimated 22.4 
million people are living with HIV 
in the region—around two thirds of 
the global total.”3 As a result, large 
numbers of deminers in Africa are 
at a significant risk of contracting 
HIV/AIDS for many reasons, in-
cluding worker mobility and ex-
tended separation from spouses.
For a deminer, the work-leave cy-
cle provides for limited family time 
in a year. There is so much to catch 
up on when families reunite af-
ter long separation periods that the 
Demining crews always have medical teams onsite. Medics 
could be trained to run workplace hiv/aiDs advocacy programs.
all Photos courtesy of JosePh Kilino, MDD hanDler, vDs anGola
question of checking on a spouse's 
HIV status is hardly a priority. 
The demining-site remoteness 
means that deminers are cut off 
from mainstream public-health 
campaigns, including HIV/AIDS 
programs. Health workers fear trav-
eling to suspected-mined regions in 
Africa, which also leaves deminers 
isolated in terms of outreach pro-
grams. Furthermore, deminers are 
usually 20 to 49 years old, sexual-
ly active and tend to have capital to 
spend while interacting with war-
surface-laid P4B with lot numbers easily visible and rubber seals 
intact.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot
By the end of the program, all mine signs 
were removed from the cleared sites, but the 
fences remained around the former minefields 
at Surf Bay and Sapper Hill. The fences re-
mained in place not to mark the areas as unsafe, 
but to prevent unnecessary damage during the 
environmental remediation period and to allow 
proper monitoring of the regeneration process. 
Conclusion
One key conclusion from this program in-
dicates that further research and development 
is necessary to improve the ability of manual-
ly detecting minimum-metal mines at greater 
depths. The program encountered many phys-
ical and philosophical challenges; however, it 
was an enormous success. This pilot phase will 
undoubtedly inform future projects about the 
technical, environmental and logistical chal-
lenges associated with clearance in the Falk-
land Islands, and will provide more accurate 
planning data for follow-on phases.
   see endnotes page
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